
A vishing simulation using AI role play means having the employee talk to an attacker persona, played by an AI, who raises the pressure in stages. To build one, the trainer defines a persona, a sequence of levers, a few trap details and a list of debrief criteria. Here is the method, step by step.
The aim is not to trap employees, but to get them to say out loud the phrases that stop an attack. For the general framework, see our guide to cybersecurity awareness and vishing.
A module explains what vishing is. It does not put the employee in front of someone who keeps pushing. Yet vishing plays out in the relationship: a pleasant voice, an urgency, an authority growing impatient.
Role play recreates this tension in a safe setting. The learner speaks, the other party reacts, and the debrief shows what was said. They can then start again.
Start from an incident you have experienced, a report, or a scenario your security team fears. One job and one request per scenario. For example: an advisor being asked for a code, a help desk asked for a password reset, or an accountant told of a change of bank account details.
The closer the case is to everyday work, the more the learner recognizes the situation. Avoid spectacular scenarios and favor ordinary requests, because those are the ones that get through.
The persona is a profile, not a script. It describes who they claim to be, what they want to obtain and how they speak.
A credible persona is worth more than an aggressive one. Real attackers stay pleasant as long as they are getting what they want.
The scenario is more useful when the pressure rises in stages, as in a real call. Each stage activates a psychological lever: urgency, authority, guilt, reciprocity, the small ask, isolation. Our article on the levers of social engineering details them.
Example of an escalation for a fake bank advisor:
The persona only moves to the next stage if the learner has not refused. If they verify properly, the persona changes tactics or gives up.
A trap detail is a detail that should raise an alarm. The trainer places three or four in the scenario, without pointing them out.
The learner must spot them and use them: ask for the case number, compare, offer to call back. These details then serve as the basis for the debrief. For the list of questions that prove something, see how to verify a caller's identity.
A useful criterion can be checked in the transcript: it is true or false, without interpretation. The debrief relies on wordings such as:
With Face Up, the trainer writes these criteria in their own scenario, helped by a design assistant. After the session, the learner receives a debrief: objectives met or not, strengths, points to improve, an action plan and quotes of what they said. They can play again.
A real call does not end when the line goes dead. You have to report on it: who called, what was asked, what was said. The report-back is therefore an exercise in its own right, which the trainer leads after the session, in a small group or in pairs.
Each participant tells the story of their call as if reporting it to the security team: name given, department, number, requests, levers spotted, what they gave or refused. The trainer follows up with the checklist for reporting a security incident and corrects any omissions.
This exercise is a training activity, not a feature of the tool. It turns the lived experience into a reporting habit, which is often the weakest link.
Imagine a call to an advisor. The persona introduces themselves as “Mark, from the fraud unit” and asks for a code received by text to “cancel a fraudulent transfer”. Here is what a learner who gets through the stages might say:
“I never give out a code over the phone, whatever the reason. Give me your name, your department and the case number. I'm hanging up and I'll call you back on the department's official number.”
This answer does not justify itself, accuses no one and gives no hold to the next lever. It contains three observable criteria: asking for the case number, offering a call-back, giving no code. That is exactly what the debrief should be able to quote.
If the learner gives in at the guilt stage, the debrief can quote their sentence and suggest an alternative. The gap between what they said and what they could have said is the heart of the learning. To hold a refusal when the caller insists, see phrases for saying no under pressure on the phone.
Before launching the exercise, run your scenario through these questions. Each one should get a “yes”.
Have a colleague test the scenario before offering it to the team. A dry run quickly reveals a trap that is too obvious or an ambiguous criterion. Adjust, then roll out, and revisit the scenario when a new method appears in the reports.
Yes. The exercise is announced, framed and debriefed. It is not a surprise call on their phone, but a practice scenario in which they know they are training.
A few minutes are enough for a complete call, followed by the debrief and a possible second attempt. Short, frequent scenarios are better than one long annual session.
Compare the criteria met from one session to the next, for example the proportion of employees who offer a call-back. Our article on measuring the effectiveness of awareness training suggests indicators.
The two complement each other: the campaign measures the click, the role play trains the conversation. See the limits of phishing simulation when it comes to voice.
To build your first vishing scenario with your own cases, book a Face Up demo.
From reading to practice.
Pick a real-life situation and talk to an AI persona, by video with an avatar or by audio call. 5 to 10 minutes, no account, instant debrief.
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